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*E.I.P.R. 591  The European Commission consulted between 23 March and 15 June 2016 
on the role of publishers in the copyright value chain. This response by the European 
Copyright Society (1) analyses why an intervention creating a new neighbouring right for 
publishers is being considered in the wake of recent decisions by the CJEU in Reprobel 
(2015), and the German BGH (2016) in Verlegeranteil; (2) examines the rationale for 
neighbouring rights; (3) advises against double layering of rights; (4) assesses the 
implications of a neighbouring right for publishers for "open access" policies; and (5) 
identifies regulatory design flaws in the introduction of an ancillary right for press 
publishers in Germany (2013) and Spain (2014). In conclusion, it is argued that value 
generation in itself is not a good case for intellectual property protection, and that the onus 
of proof needs to lie with the proponents of a new right. They need to show what the costs 
are, who will carry them, and that the costs are necessary and proportionate; and to 
provide verifiable evidence. 
 
 A neighbouring right for publishers—why now?  
In its call for a "Public Consultation on the Role of Publishers in the Copyright Value Chain", 
the European Commission says it wishes to consult  
"all stakeholders as regards the impact that a possible change in EU law to grant publishers 
[of newspapers, magazines, books and scientific journals] a new neighbouring right would 
have on them, on the whole publishing value chain, on consumers/citizens and creative 
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industries".1 
 The possibility of a general neighbouring right for publishers was not announced in the 
Communication of 9 December 2015 setting out the copyright reform programme of the 
Juncker Commission.2 So it comes as a surprise that such a far-reaching intervention is 
suddenly being considered. 
Moreover the Consultation does not tell us what kind of right is envisaged. As a point of 
process, it is problematic to consult on impacts unless at least the contours of the proposed 
intervention are understood. What will a new right cover, how long will it last, will it be 
subject to exceptions? We can’t have a sense of the effects of an intervention unless we 
know what it may be. 
There are recent models of ancillary rights for press publishers from Germany (§§87f-h 
UrhG, amended 2013, Presseleistungsschutz) and Spain (amendment to quotation 
exception, Ley de Propiedad Intelectual, art.32.2, 2014, "Google tax"). The UK has a 
copyright for the "typographical arrangement of a published edition" lasting 25 years (s.8 
CDPA 1988). Arguably the Database Directive (Directive 1996/9) providing for a sui 
generis right protecting substantial investment in the contents of a database also 
establishes a publishers’ right (for 15 years). These all differ in subject-matter, term and 
scope, and none appears to have had the intended consequences. 
While there has been lobby pressure to do something for press publishers for some time,3 
new proposals for a neighbouring right seem to be triggered by two court cases, Reprobel 
in the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) *E.I.P.R. 592  on a reference from Belgium,4 and 
the German Verlegeranteil decision by the highest federal civil court, the 
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH).5 The effect of these decisions was to deprive book publishers of 
a 50 per cent share of "fair remuneration" collected under art.5(2)(a) and (b) of the 2001 
Copyright Directive by collecting societies to compensate right holders for the exceptions 
for reprography and private copying.6 
The CJEU (followed by the BGH) held that publishers are not named among the right 
holders of the reproduction right under art.2 of Directive 2001/29 (only authors, 
performers, phonogram producers, film producers and broadcasters are listed),7 and that 
collecting societies therefore were not entitled to distribute half of their revenues by default 
to publishers.8 The Advocate General’s Opinion also suggests that any additional national 
intervention to compensate publishers cannot be to the detriment of the fair compensation 
payable to authors under art.5(2)(a) and (b).9 
The annual revenues of Reprobel (the Belgian collecting society for reprography rights) are 
in the region of €26 million10; VG Wort (the German collecting society for writers and 
publishers) collected €305 million in 2015.11 If up to 50 per cent of levy revenues were 
distributed to publishers in contravention of EU law, there would now be claims that 
publishers should repay this compensation to authors, in addition to the loss of future 
revenues. Understandably, publishers do not like this, and there may be adjustments 
needed to their contractual practices and business models. Severe and sudden losses of 
revenue can be part of a case for transitional measures of industrial policy but, in 
themselves, they are not a good basis for policy, or provide valid justification for 
introducing a novel right of intellectual property.12 
If indeed the new neighbouring right is designed to turn back the clock to the situation 
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before the CJEU Reprobel and BGH Verlegeranteil judgments, the Consultation should say 
so. It should also explain how this is to be done, without depriving authors of the fair 
compensation they are due under art.5(2)(a) and (b) of Directive 2001/29. 
 
 The rationale for neighbouring rights  
Neighbouring rights typically have different thresholds of protection and a different term 
from authors’ rights. They are given, the Consultation says, for "organisational or financial 
effort".13 The prime example of a neighbouring right comes from art.10 of the 1961 Rome 
Convention, under which producers of phonograms "shall enjoy the right to authorize or 
prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction of their phonograms" for a minimum term of 20 
years (art.14).14 Do publishers have a case for "equal treatment" with phonogram 
producers? 
Whereas the case for neighbouring rights for performers has always been strong, since 
performing artists are excluded from the domain of authors’ rights even though performing 
a work of authorship is usually a creative act, the same cannot be said for the other three 
categories of neighbouring right holders traditionally protected in the EU (phonogram 
producers, broadcasters and film producers). The primary rationale here is economic; by 
granting temporary exclusive rights, investment in phonogram production, broadcasting 
and film production is presumably fostered and rewarded. 
Note that at the time that neighbouring rights for these industries were introduced—in the 
Rome Convention of 1961—producing records and broadcasting usually required large 
up-front investment in technical infrastructure, such as recording and broadcasting 
studios. This was still the case when neighbouring rights were first harmonised in Europe 
(and extended to film producers) in the Rental and Lending Right Directive (Directive 
1992/100, codified as Directive 2006/115). According to its 7th Recital (now Recital 5), 
"the investments required particularly for the production of phonograms and films are 
especially high and risky". Whether this is still true today, now that digital *E.I.P.R. 
593  technologies have reduced the costs of sound recording, broadcasting and video 
production by several orders of magnitude, is, however, questionable. 
The Consultation tentatively justifies extending neighbouring rights to publishers by 
equating them with phonogram producers. In our opinion, such an extension would be 
unjustified. In 2016 publishing requires very limited up-front investment in technical 
infrastructure. Formerly cost- and labour-intensive activities such as typography, layout, 
and typesetting have become largely redundant thanks to low-cost digital word-processing 
and formatting technology. Investment in printing facilities is also largely a thing of the 
past; large and expensive printing presses have long been replaced by easily affordable 
digital printing facilities. In many sectors printing has been outsourced, or even been 
replaced by low-cost digital dissemination. Most of the investment in publishing today is in 
content aggregation, branding and marketing; these activities, however, have never 
justified neighbouring rights protection in the past, and should not do so today. 
 
 Double layering of rights  
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Exploitation rights are already available for publishers who acquire these contractually 
from authors, often for the full term of copyright (life plus 70 years). An extra layer of 
rights for publishers is therefore deeply problematic. 
As a general principle, multiple layers of rights should be avoided for at least three reasons: 
(1) they increase transaction costs by generating uncertainties and complexities in rights 
negotiations and clearance; (2) they create confusion for users with respect to limitations 
and exceptions, in particular if these are not aligned between neighbouring and authors’ 
rights15; (3) they have distributional consequences that are difficult to foresee. For 
example, they may diminish the revenues available for each category of right holder, as 
the same revenues from exploitation will be split in different ways (and the pie may not get 
bigger). We can be certain that a neighbouring right for publishers will affect the income of 
authors. 
Equating publishers with phonogram producers may also lead to conceptual problems. The 
neighbouring right of phonogram producers focuses on the "first fixation" of sounds (i.e. 
the initial recording), which in the past occurred at the initiative and under the 
responsibility of the phonogram producer. It will be difficult to identify the appropriate 
connecting factor for a neighbouring right for publishers. The "first fixation" of a published 
work will in many (if not most) cases be made by the author of the work, not its publisher. 
A neighbouring right similar to the phonographic right would therefore in most instances 
vest in the author, not the publisher of the work—in other words, a neighbouring right 
analogous to the phonographic right may defeat its purpose. 
While the history of neighbouring rights is complex, apart from performers’ rights, they 
should be treated as incentives. They make investments possible which otherwise would 
not have happened. And they should only be available where there are no other rights that 
already deliver. 
 
 Open access costs  
One possible unexpected impact of granting a neighbouring right to publishers might be a 
significant hindrance to open access policies. 
In its research strategy and regulatory framework, the EU advocates a mandatory 
publication in open access of all published research outcomes that result from EU funding. 
This is an obligation that appears in all funding schemes related to Horizon 2020.16 
Similarly, an increasing number of Member States and national research agencies have 
started to impose an open access mandate on publicly funded researchers. 
A great proportion of scientific publishers are still reluctant to authorise the authors of 
scientific articles they publish to communicate the published version in open access after 
the initial publication in the journal, when researchers have given exclusive licences or 
transferred their rights (which is customary in major scientific journals). 
Researchers are then stuck between their obligation towards their university or funding 
contract and their contract with publishers of renowned journals. A recognition of a 
neighbouring right for publishers in the final edited layout of the journal might run counter 
to the open access strategy of the EU research policy and of the researchers themselves. 
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Should a specific and exclusive right be granted to publishers, a contract authorising open 
access publication would be useless. Indeed publishers would be entitled to oppose any 
making available of the published versions of the articles, including in open access, 
irrespective of the contractual provision preserving that right of authors. 
One could argue that such opposition might not happen if the related right of publishers is 
limited to a remuneration right. Yet, it would not immunise open access repositories or 
journals from compensating publishers whose articles have been included without their 
authorisation. The obligation for such compensation would greatly impair the open access 
model and would particularly prejudice universities that manage open access repositories 
of all articles published by their *E.I.P.R. 594  professors and researchers. Following the 
CJEU case law,17 rights of fair compensation are left untouched by a possible authorisation 
from copyright or neighbouring right holders. 
The only open access road that would remain untouched by a new right of publishers would 
be the so-called gold road of open access, where an article is immediately published in 
open access mode in dedicated journals. However, even though open access publications 
are expanding and flourishing in all scientific disciplines, they have not yet dethroned (and 
will arguably not in the near future) ranked scientific journals, in which scientists need to 
publish for career advancement and which routinely require copyright assignment. 
 
 A neighbouring right for press publishers?  
There have been serious regulatory design flaws and unintended consequences from the 
recent attempts to introduce ancillary rights for press publishers in Germany and Spain. 
In Germany, press publishers were granted "an exclusive right to make the press product 
or parts thereof available to the public for commercial purposes, unless this pertains to 
individual words or the smallest of text excerpts" (new §87(f)(1)—UrhG, amendment of 7 
May 2013) for a term of one year. 
Google, the target of the intervention, refused to engage in licensing discussions, and 
required instead an opt-in from publishers for snippets and thumbnails to be included on 
Google News. Traffic to publishers’ sites fell, and they eventually granted a non-exclusive, 
royalty-free licence via the collecting society VG Media (to which publishers had transferred 
their rights). VG Media and 41 publishers filed a competition complaint against Google for 
abuse of a dominant position, which the federal competition authority Bundeskartellamt 
rejected in 2015, as did the Berlin regional court in February 2016. The court did not mince 
its words.18 
The outcome is to restore, with respect to Google, the situation before the 2013 
Presseleistungsschutz intervention—but with considerably increased transaction costs. 
Even more concerning is the effect of the ancillary right on smaller news aggregators. In 
Germany, they have delisted press publishers (Bing News) or completely stopped using 
snippets (Rivva). These negative effects on the freedom of information were predictable,19 
and indicate the sensitivity of intervening in news markets through an intellectual property 
rights regime. 
In Spain, too, Google was the target of an amendment to the "quotation exception" 
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(amendment to art.32.2 Ley de Propiedad Intelectual, 5 November 2014) authorising the 
making available to the public by providers of (news) aggregation services of contents 
available online subject to unwaivable equitable compensation, mandatorily managed by 
collecting societies. 
In response, Google closed googlenews.es immediately (December 2014) in order to avoid 
what had been widely termed the "Google tax". Traffic to news publishers’ websites 
declined by an average of 6 per cent, for small publishers by 14 per cent.20 The collecting 
society CEDRO has not negotiated a single licence. 
 
 Conclusion—presumption against new rights  
There can be legitimate debate about the changing nature of investments and business 
models by publishers. But this is not in itself a valid rationale for granting intellectual 
property rights. There has been a tendency to see all value generated as a case for 
protection. It is a slippery slope from press publishers and scientific publishers to music 
publishers, to museums, festival organisers, and so on. And why not search engines and 
online platforms and aggregators? They all invest and create value. There is a potentially 
endless list of value generating activity in the copyright sphere. 
The potential costs of new intellectual property rights typically are of two kinds: higher 
prices and loss of innovation. In the UK, the Hargreaves and Gower Reviews therefore 
recommended making the policy process more transparent and rigorous. Recommendation 
1 of the Hargreaves Report reads:  
"Government should ensure that development of the IP system is driven as far as possible 
by objective evidence. Policy should balance measurable economic objectives against 
social goals and potential benefits for rights holders against impacts on consumers and 
other interests. These concerns will be of particular importance in assessing future claims 
to extend rights or in determining desirable limits to rights. *E.I.P.R. 595  " 21 
 IP rights, once created, have proved almost impossible to abolish. In a period of rapid 
technological and industrial change, the standards of evidence required must be 
particularly high. A fundamental point relates to the onus of proof.22 Any new intellectual 
property right is likely to bring costs. That is the point of rights; otherwise they could not 
perform an economic function. Someone needs to pay. It is therefore up to the proponents 
of new rights to show what these costs are, who will carry them, and that the costs are 
necessary and proportionate; and to provide verifiable evidence. 
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